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Abstract. Combinatorial optimization is a fundamental problem found in many
fields. In many real life situations, the constraints and the objective function form-
ing the optimization problem are naturally distributed amongst different sites in
some fashion. A typical approach for solving such problem is to collect all of this
information together and centrally solve the problem. However, this requires all
parties to completely share their information, which may lead to serious privacy
issues. Thus, it is desirable to propose a privacy preserving technique that can
securely solve specific combinatorial optimization problems. A further compli-
cating factor is that combinatorial optimization problems are typically NP-hard,
requiring approximation algorithms or heuristics to provide a practical solution.
In this paper, we focus on a very well-known hard problem – the distributed graph
coloring problem, which has been utilized to model many real world problems in
scheduling and resource allocation. We propose efficient protocols to securely
solve such fundamental problem. We analyze the security of our approach and
experimentally demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.
Keywords: Privacy, Secure Computation, CombinatorialOptimization,Meta-Heuristic
1 Introduction
Optimization is a fundamental problem found in many fields, and it has many applica-
tions in operational research, artificial intelligence, machine learning and mathematics.
In many real life situations, the constraints and the objective function forming the op-
timization problem are naturally distributed amongst different sites in some fashion. A
typical approach for solving such problem is to collect all of this information together
and centrally solve the problem. For example in supply chain management, since the
delivery trucks are not always fully loaded (i.e. empty 25% of the time), a collaborative
logistics service (Nistevo.com) can be utilized to merge loads from different compa-
nies bound to the same destination. Huge savings were realized in such collaborative
⋆ The short version of this paper appeared in the proceedings of 2011 IEEE International Con-
ference on Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust [21].
transportation (freight costs were cut by 15%, for an annual savings of $2 million[41]),
which can be modeled as a typical distributed linear programming problem.
However, this requires all parties to completely share their information, which may
lead to serious privacy issues simply because each party’s portion of the optimization
problem typically refers to its private information. For instance, in constrained opti-
mization, the private constraints often describe the limitations or preferences of a party,
and each party’s share of the global solution represents its private output in the global
best decision or assignments. Furthermore, even without privacy constraints, solving an
optimization problem typically is computationally very expensive.
Thus, an open question is whether we can solve such problems both securely and
efficiently? This challenging issue has been investigated only in the context of a few
optimization problems. Specifically, Vaidya [42] securely solved the collaborative lin-
ear programming problem, assuming that one party holds its private objective function
while the other party holds its private constraints. Sakuma et al. [37] proposed a genetic
algorithm for securely solving two-party distributed traveler salesman problem (TSP)
[45], assuming that one party holds the cost vector while the other party holds the ex-
act cities that should be visited. Atallah et al. [2] proposed protocols for secure supply
chain management. However, none of these can be used to solve general problems such
as distributed scheduling or network resource allocation [33]. In this paper, we focus
on this class of problems. For instance, consider a simple multi-party job scheduling
problem:
Example 1. Alice, Bob and Carol have jobs {1, 2, 3},{4, 5} and {6, 7} respectively; as
depicted in Fig. 1(a) (edges represent conflicts), some jobs cannot be assigned into the
same time slot due to resource conflicts (i.e. sharing the same machine); Since each job
is held by a specific party, they do not want to reveal their set of jobs and corresponding
assigned time slots to each other. Given this, is it possible to securely assign the 7 jobs
into k time slots?
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Fig. 1. Distributed Graph Coloring Problem
Intuitively, the above scheduling problem can be modeled as a distributed (among
3 parties) k-coloring problem (the decision problem of graph coloring). Specifically,
given k different colors (k time slots), the undirected graph G = (V,E) represents
the jobs and their conflicts (as shown in Fig. 1(a)) – a vertex represents a job, and an
edge between two vertices represents a conflict between the corresponding jobs. Now,
each vertex should be assigned one out of k colors (representing the time assignment
for a job), with no two vertices connected by an edge having the same color (no two
jobs having a conflict should be scheduled into the same time slot). Thus, a feasible
k-coloring solution represents a feasible scheduling solution.
Note that G is partitioned such that each party owns a subgraph (i.e, holds some
vertices and the edges related to its own vertices). As shown in Fig. 1(a), Alice, Bob
and Carol hold 3, 2 and 2 jobs, respectively. The adjacency matrix of the graph is thus
partitioned as shown in Fig. 1(b). When formulating and solving this problem, Alice,
Bob and Carol do not want to reveal their partition in the graph and the colors of their
vertices to each other. Hence, the primary goal of this paper is to propose a privacy-
preserving solver for the distributed graph coloring problems.
Furthermore, in many combinatorial optimization problems, exhaustive search is
not feasible due to the NP-hard nature of them. Since graph coloring problem has been
proven to be NP-hard (its decision problem, k-coloring problem is NP-complete), se-
curely solving the graph coloring problem should be extremely challenging due to the
computational complexity. Several meta-heuristics such as tabu search have been pro-
posed to solve the centralized graph coloring problem by improving the performance
of local search with memory structures [4][5][9]. Even if meta-heuristics cannot guar-
antee an optimal results, they are generally considered to be quite effective in solving
combinatorial optimization problems and obtain near-optimal outputs in an acceptable
running time. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a secure and efficient algorithm to
enable distributed tabu search.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally defines the problem
and reviews the tabu search method for graph coloring. Section 3 introduces a secure
and efficient protocol to solve distributed graph coloring problem, assuming that all
parties are honest-but-curious (obey the protocol). Section 4 provides a formal security
analysis and complexity analysis. Section 5 experimentally validates the performance
of our approach. Section 7 concludes the paper and discusses some directions for future
work.
2 Problem Definition
In graph theory, the k-coloring problem represents the following NP-complete decision
problem[35] – does graphG have a proper vertex coloring with k colors. The (NP-hard)
optimization version of this problem simply seeks the minimum k that can properly
color the given graph. The minimum k is known as the chromatic number of the graph.
Since, seeking the chromatic number can be reduced to a set of k-coloring problems,
we only consider the k-coloring problem on distributed graphs in this paper. We first
formally define the graph coloring (decision problem), review tabu search for graph
coloring, and then introduce our solution approach.
2.1 Graph Coloring Problem Formulation with Scalar Products
When seeking the chromatic number k or solving the k-coloring problem, any solution
requires that the number of adjacent vertices having the same color should be 0. We thus
denote any two adjacent vertices that have the same color as a “conflict” in a colored
graph. Thus, given k different colors, if we let µ represent the total number of conflicts
in a coloredG, we thus have: ifmin(µ) = 0, G is k-colorable.
Given k colors, we can represent the color of any vertex in the graph using a k-
dimensional boolean vector x (domain Φ(k): all the k-dimensional boolean vectors
include only one “1” and k − 1 “0”s). If the ith number in the boolean vector is 1 (all
the remaining numbers should be 0), the current vertex is colored with the ith color
(i ∈ [1, k]). Thus, we let x = {xi, ∀vi ∈ G} be a coloring solution in a k-coloring
problem where xi represents the coloring boolean vector for vertex vi. In addition,
given the coloring boolean vectors of two adjacent vertices xi, xj ∈ x (i 6= j and
vi, vj ∈ G), we can represent the color conflict of vi and vj in solution x as the scalar
product of xi and xj :
µij(x) =
{
0 if xi · xj = 0 (vi and vj are not conflicted)
1 if xi · xj = 1 (vi and vj are conflicted)
(1)
where µ(x) =
∑
∀eij∈G
µij(x). We thus formulate the k-coloring problem as
{min :
∑
∀eij∈G
xi · xj , s.t.∀vi, vj ∈ G, xi, xj ∈ Φ(k)}. If and only if the optimal
value is 0, the problem is k-colorable. When seeking the chromatic number k, we can
solve the above problem using different k and choose the minimum colorable k.
2.2 Tabu Search for Solving Graph Coloring Problems
Tabu search uses a memory structure to enhance the performance of a local search
method. Once a potential solution has been determined, it is marked as “taboo”. So the
algorithm does not visit that possibility repeatedly. Tabu search has been successfully
used for graph coloring. Specifically, given a graphG = (V,E) and k colors, a popular
tabu search algorithm for graph coloring – Tabucol [9] (summarized using our notation)
is described as follows:
1. initialize a solution x = (∀vi ∈ G, xi ∈ φ(k)) by randomly selecting colors.
2. iteratively generate neighbors x′ of x until µ(x′) < µ(x) by changing the color of
an endpoint of an arbitrary conflicted edge vi : xi → x
′
i (if no x
′ is found with
µ(x′) < µ(x) in a specified number of iterations, find a best x′ in current set of
neighborhoods where (vi, x
′
i) is not in the tabu list, and let x
′ be the next solution).
3. if (vi, x
′
i) is not in the tabu list, make current x
′ (best so far) as the next solution
x = x′ and add the pair (vi, xi) into the tabu list; If (vi, x
′
i) is in the tabu list and
µ(x′) is still smaller than µ(x), make x′ as the next solution anyway; Otherwise,
discard x′.
4. repeat step 2,3 until µ(x′) = 0 or the maximum number of iterations is reached.
2.3 Securely Solving Distributed Graph Coloring Problems
Recall that Example 1 can be modeled by a distributed graph coloring problem on a
graph G whose adjacency matrix is partitioned among m parties (each vertex belongs
to only one party). We thus define it as follows:
Definition 1 (Distributed Graph Coloring (DisGC)). Given k colors and a parti-
tioned graph G = (V,E) where each vertex vi ∈ V belongs to only one party, does a
k-coloring of G exist?
In the distributed graph, we define two different types of edges: 1. internal edge:
any edge eij whose endpoints (vi and vj) are owned by the same party; 2. external
edge: any edge eij whose endpoints (vi and vj ) belong to two different parties. Simi-
larly, we define two categories of vertices: 1. inner vertex: a vertex that does not have
any external edge (e.g.,. v1 in Fig. 1(a)) 2. border vertex: a vertex that has at least one
external edge (e.g., v2 in Fig. 1(a)).
When m different parties want to collaboratively solve the DisGC problem, each
party does not want to reveal its partition in G and the colors of its vertices to others.
For instance, suppose we color the graph in Fig. 1(a) using k = 3 colors, the parties
should only learn the relevant information. For example, Fig. 2(a) gives a 3-colored
global solution, corresponding to which Alice, Bob and Carol would only know the
information shown in Fig. 2(b), 2(c) and 2(d), respectively. Thus, each party only sees
the colors assigned to the vertices in their local graph and cannot even see the color of
the border vertices of other parties that share an external edge with this party (the vertex
existence is known anyway). For example, in Alice’s view of Bob’s graph, only vertex
4 which is directly connected to vertex 2 in Alice’s graph is visible to Alice, though its
color is not known to Alice.
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Fig. 2. A Secure Solution to the DisGC Problems
Thus, we have two privacy requirements when solving the DisGC problem: first,
protect each party’s subset of the graph structure including its vertices and the internal
edges (the external edges and their endpoints are inevitably known to the two parties
sharing them); second, protect the color assignment for each party’s vertices (including
the endpoints of the external edges) in every iteration. A direct method to securely solve
the DisGC problem is by using a trusted third party to collect partitioned data from all
parties, centrally solving the problem with Tabucol algorithm [9] and distributing the
color of every vertex to the vertex owner. However, if no trusted third party can be
found, a secure protocol is necessary. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to present a
privacy-preserving tabu search method for solving DisGC without a trusted third party,
assuming that all parties are honest-but-curious. The honest-but-curious assumption is
realistic, and is commonly assumed in the literature, and the solution can be generalized
to fully malicious adversaries (though at added cost).
3 Privacy Preserving Tabu Search
As mentioned in Section 2.2, a typical tabu search algorithm for graph coloring prob-
lem includes numerous repeated computations such as: computing the total number of
conflicts for a solution, searching better neighborhoods for a specific solution, verifying
a new vertex color pair with all the taboos and updating the tabu list if necessary. We
now look at how all of this can be securely done, starting with some of the fundamental
cryptographic building blocks that will be used to provide a solution.
3.1 Fundamental Cryptographic Building Blocks
Secure Scalar Product for Secure Conflict Computation For any potential solution
(a colored graph) to the DisGC problem, the total number of conflicts corresponding
to that solution must be computed to figure out whether it improves the objective. As
introduced in Section 2.1, the total number of conflicts in a solution x is denoted by
µ(x). µ(x) can be represented as the sum of all the scalar products of every two ad-
jacent vertices’ coloring vectors. To securely compute the scalar product of two end-
points on every external edge, we use Goethals et al.’s approach [8] which is based
on a public-key homomorphic cryptosystem. This is both simple and provably secure.
The problem is defined as follows: Pa has a n-dimensional vector X while Pb has
a n-dimensional vector Y . At the end of the protocol, Pa should get vector vector
X · Y + rb where rb is a random number chosen from a uniform distribution and is
known only to Pb. The key idea behind the protocol is to use a homomorphic encryp-
tion system such as the Paillier cryptosystem [34]. A homomorphic cryptosystem is
a semantically-secure public-key encryption system which has the additional property
that given any two encryptions E(A) and E(B), there exists an encryption E(A ∗ B)
such that E(A) ∗ E(B) = E(A ∗ B), where ∗ is either addition or multiplication (in
some Abelian group). The cryptosystemsmentioned above are additively homomorphic
(thus the operation ∗ denotes addition). Using such a system, it is quite simple to create
a scalar product protocol. If Pa encrypts its vector X and sends Encpk(X) with the
public key pk to Pb, Pb can use the additive homomorphic property to compute the
encrypted sum of scalar product and its random number: Encpk(X · Y + rb). Finally,
Pb sends Encpk(X ·Y + rb) back to Pa. Thus, Pa decrypts and obtainX ·Y + rb (rb
and X · Y are unknown to Pa). Since Pb cannot decrypt Encpk(X · Y + rb) with a
public key, it cannot learn the scalar product either.
Therefore, we can adopt the above cryptographic building block to securely com-
pute the total number of conflicting edges µ(x) in solution x (Secure Conflict Computa-
tion). Note: while computing µ(x), it is not necessary to securely compute the number
of each party’s conflicting internal edges in x. Alternatively, we can let each party in-
dependently count them, and sum the number with its shares in secure scalar product
computation. The detailed steps are shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Secure Conflict Computation
Input: G = (V,E) is colored as x ∈ Φ(k) where the color of ∀vi ∈ G is denoted as xi ∈ x.
Output: each party Pa’s share µa(x) in µ(x) where µ(x) =
∑
∀a
µa(x);
1: for each party Pa do
2: count the total number of its conflicting internal edges as µa(x);
3: end for
4: for all external edges eij ∈ G do
5: ∗ ∗ ∗∗ Suppose that vi and vj belong to Pa and Pb, respectively. ∗ ∗ ∗∗
6: W.o.l.g. Pa creates a public and private key pair (pk, sk);
7: Pa encrypts its color vector xi as x
′
i = Encpk(xi) and sends x
′
i and pk to Pb;
8: Pb generates a random integer rij , encrypts the scalar product as: x
′′
i = Encpk(xi · xj) ∗
Encpk(rij) with the public key pk, and sends x
′′
i back to Pa;
9: Pa decrypts x
′′
i with its private key sk and obtain sij = xi · xj + rij ;
10: end for
11: for each party Pa do
12: µa(x)← µa(x) +
∑
∀sij (received from other parties)−
∑
∀rij (generated by Pa);
13: end for
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Fig. 3. Example for Secure Conflict Computation
Fig. 3(a) and 3(b) provide a simple example of Secure Conflict Computation. For
each external edge, such as e24, e36, e47 and e56, the scalar product computation is
carried out between the two involved parties. As shown in Fig. 3(b), the returned value
in secure scalar product computation is the sum of µij(x) and a random number rij
generated by the other party (Note: the scalar product of every external edge is securely
computed only once). To generate each party’s output, each party then sums all the
returned values with its number of conflicting internal edges, and finally subtracts all
its generated random numbers (the sum of all parties’ outputs should be µ(x)). This
protocol is provably secure.
Secure Comparison Given two solutions x and x′, we can let each party Pa gener-
ate its shares µa(x) and µa(x
′) in µ(x) and µ(x′) respectively, ensuring that µ(x) =∑
∀a µa(x) and µ(x
′) =
∑
∀a µa(x
′). However, µ(x) and µ(x′) cannot be revealed to
any party because they may lead to additional privacy breach in generating neighbor-
hoods.
Algorithm 2 SecCompare(µ(x′), µ(x),m)
Input: G = (V,E), partitioned sum of scalar products µ(x) and µ(x′) held bym parties;
Output: µ(x′) ≥ µ(x) or µ(x′) < µ(x);
{Each party ∀a ∈ [1, m], Pa has a share of µ(x) and µ(x
′): µa(x), µa(x
′)}
1: for all parties Pa, a ∈ [1, m] do
2: Secure Comparing µ(x) and µ(x′) using its share µa(x) and µa(x
′);
3: end for
To securely compare µ(x′) and µ(x) using all parties’ partitioned shares (as shown
in Algorithm 2), we can adopt Yao’s secure comparison protocol [46] that compares
any two integers securely. Yao’s generic method is one of the most efficient meth-
ods known. Recently, FairplayMP [3] is developed for secure multiparty computation
where m untrusted parties with private inputs x1, . . . , xm wish to jointly compute a
specific functions fi(x1, . . . , xm) and securely obtain each party’s output. Specifically,
FairplayMP is implemented by writing functions with a high-level language – Secure
Function Definition Language (SFDL) 2.0 and describing the participating parties us-
ing a configuration file. The function is then complied into a Boolean circuit, and a
distributed evaluation of the circuit is finally performed without revealing anything. In
our secure comparison, each party has the shares in µ(x) and µ(x′) respectively; the
function should be µ(x′)− µ(x) (computed by allm parties); the output µ(x′) < µ(x)
or µ(x′) ≥ µ(x) is generated for designated parties. Finally, we have to compare µ(x)
and 0 to decide whether to terminate the optimization or not. With the same protocol,
we can let all parties securely compare µ(x) and 1 with inputs from all parties (the
shares of µ(x) and 1). The output µ(x) < 1 or µ(x) ≥ 1 is similarly generated for
corresponding parties.
3.2 Privacy Preserving Tabu Search
Distributed Tabu List In each iteration of Tabucol algorithm, a set of neighborhoods is
generated for current solution x in local search. While generating a new neighborhood
x′, if the new vertex color in x′ has already been considered as a taboo in previous
iterations, x′ should be abandoned except in the case that that µ(x′) < µ(x) (aspiration
criteria). Thus, checking whether the tabu list T includes a move [x → x′] (we denote
the color change for only one vertex as a move) is a key step in privacy-preserving tabu
search.
Like Hertz[9], we define every taboo in T as a visited color for a specific vertex. If
all parties share a global tabu list, the taboos in T may reveal private information (each
parties’ vertices and unallowed colors). To protect such information, we can let each
party Pa, a ∈ [0,m − 1] establish a tabu list Ta to record the latest color of one of its
vertices that leads to a critical move (µ(x) reduced move). We thus have T =
⋃
∀a Ta.
Intuitively, since each party manipulates its own tabu list, distributed tabu list does not
breach privacy.
Inference Attack in the Outputs of Local Search Since tabu search is a local search
based technique, the computation in local search (generating neighborhoods) should
be secured. However, even if computing number of conflicts and comparing µ(x) and
µ(x′) are secured by homomorphic encryption and secure comparison, potential infer-
ence attack still exists in the outputs of secure computation adapted local search.
In a distributed graph (as shown in Fig. 1(a)), an edge is either internal (belongs
to one party) or external (belongs to two parties). Similarly, we can divide the vertices
into two complementary groups: 1. Inner Vertex: a vertex that is not on any external
edge (i.e. v1 in Fig. 3(a)) 2. Border Vertex: a vertex that is on at least one external edge
(might be on both of external edges and internal edges, i.e. v2 in Fig. 3(a)).
We first assume that no secure comparison is applied and vi is the color changed
vertex in generating x’s neighborhood x′ (µ(x) is revealed in each iteration). If vi is an
inner vertex, since vi is disconnected with other parties’ vertices, nothing is revealed
to each other. However, if vi is a border vertex, we first look at a simple case: vi is an
endpoint of only one external edge (i.e. v5 in Fig. 1(a)). Assume that Pa and Pb hold vi
(color xi) and vj (color xj) respectively where eij is the external edge. While changing
vi’s color xi to x
′
i, since the number of Pa’s conflicting internal edges in x and x
′ are
known to Pa and the total number of conflicts on the remaining edges (including all
the external edges except eij and other parties’ internal edges) are identical in x and
x′, the difference between µij(x) (eij has conflict or not in solution x) and µij(x
′) (eij
has conflict or not in solution x′) can be inferred by Pa. We thus discuss the potential
privacy breach in three cases where δ = µij(x
′)− µij(x):
1. δ = 1. Pa can infer xj = x
′
i. The color of vj is learnt by Pa.
2. δ = 0. Pa can infer xj 6= xi and xj 6= x
′
i. It is secure for large k. For small k, Pa
can guess xj as any color out of remaining k-2 colors except xi and x
′
i.
3. δ = −1. Pa can infer xj = xi. The color of vj is learnt by Pa.
In a more general case, if vi is adjacent to n border vertices from other parties and no
secure comparison is implemented in tabu search, moving vi to generate neighborhoods
is under the risk of inference attack:
Lemma 1. Given a coloring solution x, we generate x’s neighborhood x′ by chang-
ing the color of a border vertex vi of party Pa which is adjacent to n vertices {∀j ∈
[1, n], vj} from other parties. If no secure comparison is implemented in tabu search
(Pa knows δ =
∑
∀j∈[1,n][µij(x
′)− µij(x)]), precisely one of the following holds:
1. if δ ≥ 0, Pa can guess the color of vj as xj = x
′
i with Prob[xj = x
′
i] =
δ+⌊n+δ
2
⌋
2n
and guess xj = xi with Prob[xj = xi] =
⌊n−δ
2
⌋
2n where δ ∈ [0, n];
2. if δ < 0, Pa can guess the color of vj as xj = xi with Prob[xj = xi] =
−δ+⌊n−δ
2
⌋
2n
and guess xj = x
′
i with Prob[xj = x
′
i] =
⌊n+δ
2
⌋
2n where δ ∈ [−n,−1].
We prove Lemma 1 in AppendixA (we do not discuss the probability of guessing xj
as any color out of remaining k-2 colors except xi and x
′
i since the probability is fairly
small in general). Hence, if µ(x) is revealed in each iteration (no secure comparison
protocol is applied), the probability of guessing any other parties’ border vertex color
is high. For instance, assuming that xi = Blue, x
′
i = Red, δ = 3 and n = 5, Pa can
guess that xj is Red with a probability 0.7 and is Blue with a probability 0.1. If Pa
iteratively moves xi and learns the probabilities in such process, the color of vj should
be almost determined. Furthermore, if δ is close to either n or −n, the probability of
inferring privacy is extremely high, especially in case that δ = n or −n (the worst
privacy breach case for any border vertex on n external edges). Alternatively, if we
utilize secure comparison protocol to securely compareµ(x′) andµ(x) in each iteration,
such probabilities can be comparatively reduced (especially in case that δ is close to n
or −n) because δ is anonymized as any integer in [−n, n].
Lemma 2. In the same circumstance of Lemma 1, if we securely compare µ(x) and
µ(x′) (does not reveal µ(x) and µ(x′)), the risk of inference attack can be reduced in
general but still exists in two worst cases with known δa
1 as below:
1. If δa
1 = n− 1 and µ(x′) < µ(x) is the output of the secure comparison, Pa learns
∀j ∈ [1, n], xj = xi;
2. If δa
1 = −n and µ(x′) ≥ µ(x) is the output of the secure comparison, Pa learns
∀j ∈ [1, n], xj = x
′
i.
P1(n=3): if?1= n-1=2?but ?(x)?, ? should be less than -2, thus
all e0,e1,e2 should be conflicted in x and not conflicted in x’
P1P0 P2
P0(n=1): if?0= n-1=0 but ?(x)?, e0 should be conflicted in x and 
not conflicted in x’ (This happens very often)
e0 e1
e2
P2(n=2): if?2= n-1=1?but ?(x)?, ? should be less than -1, thus
all e1,e2 should be conflicted in x and not conflicted in x’
(a) Worst Case 1
P1(n=3): if?1= -n=-3?but ?(x’)? ?(x), ? should be no less than 3, 
thus all e0,e1,e2 should be conflicted in x’ and not conflicted in x
P1P0 P2
P0(n=1): if?0= -n=-1?but ?(x’)? ?(x), e0 should be conflicted in 
x’ and not conflicted in x (This happens very often)
e0 e1
e2
P2(n=2): if?2= -n=-2?but ?(x’)? ?(x), ? should be no less than 2, 
thus all e1,e2 should be conflicted in x’ and not conflicted in x
(b) Worst Case 2
Fig. 4. An Example for Inference Attack on Secure Comparison [P1(n=3) has a border vertex that
is adjacent to one vertex of P0(n=1) and two vertices of P2(n=2)]
1 δa denotes the difference between the number of Pa’s conflicting internal edges in solution x
and x′, which is known to Pa in every iteration
As described in Lemma 2 (proved in Appendix B), the worst privacy breach cases
cannot be resolved by secure comparison protocol. We show an example for two worst
cases in Fig. 4.While changing the color of P0, P1, orP2’s one border vertex to generate
neighborhoods, possible privacy breach occurs in these worst cases. For example, P0
moves its border vertex: if the number of P0’s conflicting internal edges has not been
changed in the move x → x′ and µ(x′) < µ(x) is the comparison result (both are
known to P0), the only external edge e0 should be conflicted in x and not conflicted
in x′. Thus P0 can infer that the other endpoint’s color (P1’s one border vertex) is the
same as its border vertex’s color in x (before move). This happens very often.
Therefore, we will try to eliminate such inference attack and reduce the guessing
probability even more in the following.
Synchronous Move in Local Search Since the inference attack results from the out-
put that should be revealed in each iteration (the result of comparing µ(x) and µ(x′)),
rather than the data within the secured computation function, it is extremely difficult
to resolve this issue with a secure protocol in which such comparison results are not
revealed for selecting better solution step by step (and still retaining good efficiency).
Alternatively, we can eliminate such inference attack and reduce the probabilities on
guessing conflicted external edges and the colors of other parties’ border vertices by
slightly modifying local search.
Specifically, if any border vertex vi is chosen for move while generating neighbor-
hoods for one party, we can let another party to locally change the color of one of its
vertex (either inner or border) or opt to keep invariant. We denote this mechanism as
synchronousmove. The inferences can be eliminated and the guessing possibilities can
be greatly reduced with synchronous move (we prove it in Appendix C).
Lemma 3. Synchronous move resolves the inference attack stated in Lemma 1 and 2.
Apparently, some generated neighborhoods may include two moves. In addition,
since the number of moves is at most 2, it is still effective to maintain the performance
of local search. Hence, the performance is supposed to be close to Tabucol algorithm
[9] (we show that in the experiments).
To improve the search performance, the vertex (either inner or border vertex) whose
color is changed is preferentially chosen from the vertices that are the endpoints of
edges with conflicts. Since only the conflicting internal edges are known to correspond-
ing parties, we can iteratively let each party change the color of the endpoints of its
conflicting internal edges. When moving an inner vertex, the party can independently
compare two unknown numbers µ(x′) and µ(x) (by comparing its shares in µ(x′) and
µ(x)) and check its tabu list along with specific operations on its vertices colors in x′
(update x and tabu list with x′, or abandon x′). On the other hand, moving a border ver-
tex requires secure computation of all scalar products and secure comparison of µ(x′)
and µ(x). Hence, while changing a border vertex color by one party, our privacy pre-
serving tabu search protocol calls synchronous move, secure conflict computation and
secure comparison. The result of secure comparison is only revealed to the two involved
parties. These parties use this information to check and update their tabu lists along with
specific operations on their vertices’ colors in x′.
P0 colors its
partion using
Tabu Search
P1 colors its
partion using
Tabu Search
Pm-1 colors its
partion using
Tabu Search
5. Securely Compare ?(x) and 1: if ?(x)<1, terminate protocol with k-colorable output
2. Synchronous Move: randomly choose another party Pb to possibly move one vertex color
5 5 5
1. Locally Compare ?(x) and ?(x’) by Pa: if ?(x’)< ?(x), let x=x’ and update tabu list Ta by Pa
5
4. Securely Compare ?(x) and ?(x’): if ?(x’)< ?(x), let x=x’ and update tabu lists Ta, Tb by Pa, Pb
Initialize x by
all parties
P0, P1…Pm-1
3
3. Secure Conflict Computation: ?(x) or ?(x’) is partitioned among all m parties
If an inner vertex is chosen for move by  Pa (a=0,1…m-1),
call Procedure 1; Otherwise, call Procedure 2, 3 and 4 
Procedures:
Fig. 5. Privacy Preserving Tabu Search Protocol
Privacy Preserving Tabu Search In our secure tabu search protocol, each party iter-
atively executes Tabu search on its local graph to eliminate all the conflicting internal
edges. (Each party’s local graph is a subgraph of G. Hence, if the local graph is not k-
colorable, the protocol can be terminated with output thatG is not k-colorable). During
local search, each party moves inner or border vertices (with synchronous move). If the
party executing tabu search in the given iteration does not have any conflicting internal
edge (local k-coloring is attained), this party may move one of its border vertices that
triggers synchronousmove, or skip its local search and pass control to the next party. In
addition, in each move, tabu list is locally checked and aspiration criteria is applied to
every solution (locally for inner vertex move or globally for synchronous move in two
parties’ tabu lists). Finally, in each iteration after a party finishes k-coloring of its local
graph, secure comparison protocol is called to check if an optimal solution is obtained
(i.e., µ(x) = 0). Since the output of secure comparison is divided into < and ≥, the
algorithm compares µ(x) with 1. If µ(x) = 0, the secure tabu search is terminated with
k-colorable output. If µ(x) ≥ 1 after a given number of iterations, the tabu search is
terminated with an output that G is not k-colorable. The detailed steps are presented in
Fig. 5 and Algorithm 3.
4 Analysis
In this section, we give analysis for security and complexity.
2 Aspiration Criteria: if µ(x′) < µ(x), (vi, x
′
i) ∈ Ta is allowed; Otherwise, abandon x
′.
3 Aspiration Criteria: if µ(x′) < µ(x), (vi, x
′
i) ∈ Ta and (vj , x
′
j) ∈ Tb are allowed; Otherwise,
abandon x′.
Algorithm 3 Privacy Preserving Tabu Search
Input: m parties P0, . . . , Pm−1, Graph G = (V,E);
1: initialize a solution x: randomly coloring all vertices by all parties;
2: call Secure Conflict Computation: each party hold a share of µ(x): ∀a ∈ [0, m− 1], µa(x);
3: for party Pa, a ∈ [0, m− 1] do
4: while the number of Pa’s conflicting internal edges is greater than 0 do
5: Pa generates a neighborhood x
′ by changing the color of vertex vi that is the endpoint
of one of its conflicting internal edges: xi → x
′
i;
6: if vi is an inner vertex then
7: Pa locally compare its shares in µa(x) and µa(x
′) and check its tabu list Ta;
8: if µa(x
′) < µa(x)
2 then
9: let x = x′, update the tabu list Ta and continue;
10: end if
11: else
12: pick a random party Pb (b 6= a) to possibly change the color of vertex vj : xj → x
′
j
(x′ is generated by synchronous move);
13: call Secure Conflict Computation and Secure Comparison for µ(x′) and µ(x);
14: if µ(x′) < µ(x) 3 then
15: let x = x′, update the tabu list Ta, Tb by Pa, Pb respectively and continue;
16: end if
17: end if
18: if x’s rep neighborhoods are generated (rep is given), choose a best neighborhood x′
where (vi, x
′
i) /∈ Ta, let x = x
′ and update Ta (vi is an inner vertex of Pa);
19: if Pa’s partition inG cannot be k-colored in maximum number of iterations, terminates
protocol with output: G is not k-colorable;
20: end while
21: if Pa’s partition is k-colored, Pa can move its border vertices to generate new k-coloring
solutions (call synchronous move, secure conflict computation and secure comparison);
22: call Secure Comparison to compare µ(x) and 1 among allm parties;
23: if µ(x) < 1, terminates protocol with output: G is k-colorable by solution x;
24: if µ(x) ≥ 1 after a given number of iterations, terminates protocol with output: G is not
k-colorable;
25: a = (a+ 1) mod m;
26: end for
4.1 Security Analysis
The exchanged messages of PPTS protocol occurs primarily in two sub-protocols: se-
cure scalar product computation and secure comparison. Thus, the security of our al-
gorithm depends on the security of these two algorithms. Given these secure protocols,
the security proof comes down to demonstrating that the output of those protocols can
be simulated knowing one’s own input and the final results. The composition theorem
[7] then enables completing the proof of security.
Theorem 1. PPTS privately solves the k-coloring problemwhere each partyPa learns:
1. Its share in the secure conflict computation
2. The secure comparison result in synchronous moves involving Pa
Proof. Since PPTS protocol is symmetric, proving that the view of one party can be
simulated with its own input and output suffices to prove it for all parties. We now show
how to simulate the messages received by an arbitrary party Pa, a ∈ [0,m− 1]. While
Pa is chosen to color its partition (this is iteratively done in PPTS), two cases occur.
First, if Pa changes the color of its inner vertices (Step 6-10),Pa learns onlyµ(x
′) <
µ(x) or µ(x′) ≥ µ(x) by locally comparing its shares in µ(x′) and µ(x). Other parties
learn nothing (the number of iterations to color Pa’s partition is also unknown to other
parties). Hence, these can be simulated by simply executing those steps.
Second, if Pa moves one of its border vertices, a synchronous move is triggered.
Pa now receives the share of secure conflict computation: sij (w.o.l.g. we let Pa be the
receiver of sij rather than the creator of rij ), and learns the secure comparison result of
two solutions (x and x′): µ(x′) < µ(x) or µ(x′) ≥ µ(x). We now examine Pa’s view
in Step 11-17 (and possibly include Step 21) and build a polynomial simulator that runs
for the known synchronous moves.
Steps in PPTS P0 ’s view P1 ’s view P2 ’s view … Pm-1 ’s view
P colors its 0 1 0 1 1 0 10
partition
, , , , , , …
1 (Syn. Move)1 (Syn. Move)
1, 1, 0, 1…
0 (Syn. Move)
0 (Syn. Move)
0, 1, 1…
1 (Syn. Move)1 (Syn. Move)
P1 colors its 
partition
1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1… …
P2 colors its 
partition
0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1… …
1 (Syn. Move) 1 (Syn. Move)
… … … … … …
Fig. 6. P0, . . . , Pm−1’s View (the sign of µ(x
′)− µ(x): 1 is µ(x′) < µ(x); 0 is µ(x′) ≥ µ(x))
Pa’s view: in order to simulate Pa’s view, the polynomial simulator must satisfy the
following condition: givenPa’s partition (input) and the final solution (output), simulate
the views of secure conflict computation and secure comparison in every synchronous
move (the shares in secure scalar product computation and a sequence of results of
secure comparison as shown in Figure 6). The simulator is built as below:
– The result of secure scalar product computation sij = xi · xj + rij (w.o.l.g. we
let Pa be the receiver of sij), can be simulated by generating a random from the
uniform probability distribution over F (Note: we assume that sij are scaled to
fixed precision over a closed field, enabling such a selection). Thus, Prob[T =
t] = Prob[sij = t] = Prob[rij = t− sij ] =
1
F .
– To simulate the sequence of secure comparison results for Pa, we can utilize the
inverse steps of tabu search on Pa’s border vertices (we denote this process as
inverse optimization). A key result from inverse optimization is that if the original
problem is solvable in polynomial time, the reverse problem is also solvable in
polynomial time [1]. Specifically, letting the cost function be maximizing µ(x) (x′
remains the neighborhood of x), we start from the final colorable solution (only
in Pa’s known part of the graph)
4, generate neighborhoods by changing the color
of its border vertices (color is randomly chosen), and compare µ(x′) and µ(x). If
µ(x′) > µ(x), the simulator outputs an “1”, otherwise it outputs a “0” (Since the
comparison signs in moving these vertices in the simulator are deterministic and
known to Pa, the comparison signs of synchronousmove in original PPTS protocol
can be simulated by this machine). Although the colors and the vertices might be
different from the original one, the sign of comparison is the same.
Pb’s view: First, Pb knows the sign of µ(x
′)−µ(x) in all synchronousmove in which
it is involved. Similarly, we can use the simulator to generate the signs of comparison as
above. Secondly, in all secure scalar product computation, the random number rij can
be generated again using the same uniform distribution in secure conflict computation.
Since the outputs of other parties are similar to Pb, we can use the same simulator.
In the remaining Steps of PPTS, each party redefines new current solution and ma-
nipulates the tabu list in local computation, thus we can simulate them by executing
those steps. Therefore, PPTS is secure against semi-honest behavior, assuming that all
the parties follow the PPTS protocol.
Thus, Theorem 1 has been proven. Note that, effectively, a party can learn at most
the color of the border vertex of another party with which it shares an edge. This is
useless in the intermediate stages (since the color is not fixed). In the final solution,
since typically the number of shared border vertices is significantly smaller than the
total number of vertices, the leaked information is not very significant.
There are several remaining issues. First, since our simulator is also ameta-heuristic,
the worst case running time is not polynomial. This is a problem-dependent issue: if the
problem is always solved by tabu search in polynomial time, then the simulator is guar-
anteed to be polynomial, and the protocol is secure. Second, some additional minor
information is probably leaked. For example, in the output of PPTS, given k-colorable
solution, the colors of Pa’s adjacent vertices (belong to other parties) can be known (to
Pa) with a different color from corresponding adjacent vertex. This is unavoidable in
the DisGC problem (even if we build a trusted third party, it is learned by other parties
with the output). Moreover, the number of iteratively calling different parties to color its
partition and the fact that µ(x) > 0 until the last step are also revealed. These pieces of
information are trivial and do not significantly impact the security of the PPTS protocol.
4.2 Communication and Computational Cost Analysis
Given a distributed graph with n vertices and ne external edges, in PPTS protocol, we
assume that m parties are repeatedly called to locally color their partition for c times
4 Since Pa knows the existence of some adjacent border vertices from other parties, we can let
Pa color them at the beginning. Thus, moving Pa’s any vertex is deterministic in the simulator.
and ℓ synchronousmoves are executed during coloring of the partition by a party. Based
on this, we can discuss the computation and computational cost of the PPTS protocol.
Communication Cost Note that only secure conflict computation and secure compar-
ison require communication of messages among parties. Since conflict computation for
each external edge requires two communicationmessages, the total number of messages
generated for secure conflict computation is 2c ∗ (ne ∗ ℓ + 1), where O(ne) = O(n
2).
Thus, the communication complexity of secure scalar product computation in PPTS
is O(cn2ℓ). Moreover, every secure comparison requires O(m) parties to compute
the output. Since the number of communication messages in every secure comparison
equals to the number of computing parties [27] and PPTS includes c ∗ (ℓ + 1) secure
comparison, the communication complexity of secure comparison in PPTS is O(cmℓ).
Computation Cost Since each party triggers ℓ synchronous moves while coloring its
partition, c ∗ ℓ+ 1 secure conflict computations and c ∗ (ℓ+ 1) secure comparisons are
required in PPTS. If the runtime of a single secure scalar product computation and a
single secure comparison is denoted by ts and tc respectively, the additional cost can be
estimated as (c ∗ ℓ ∗ ne + 1) ∗ ts + c ∗ (ℓ+1) ∗ tc. Thus, the computational complexity
of PPTS is O(cn2ℓ) for secure scalar product and O(cℓ) for secure comparison.
5 Experiments
In this section, we present the experimental validation of our algorithm for securely
solving distributed graph coloring problems.
5.1 Experiments Setup
For the experiments, we randomly generate graphs with the number of vertices N and
the density of the graph ρ (probability of the existence of an edge between any two
given vertices). Each generated graph is partitioned among 10 parties (P0, P1, . . . , P9),
we let each party hold N/10 vertices. In each test, we generate 10 graphs with the same
N and ρ, and report the average of the results.
We compare our privacy preserving tabu search (PPTS) algorithm with Tabucol [9]
using the same group of graphs. Both algorithms are terminated if no k-colorable so-
lution can be found in 105 iterations. We let each party hold a tabu list with length
N/10 in PPTS while the overall tabu list in Tabucol is established with lengthN/10. In
synchronous move of PPTS algorithm, we assume that Pb (the second party) has 50%
chance of skipping a move. Futhermore, in PPTS algorithm, Paillier cryptosystem [34]
with 512-bit and 1024-bit key is used for homomorphic encryption (securely comput-
ing number of conflicts). For FairplayMP [3], sufficiently large modulus length for 10
parties (i.e. 128 bits) is used for secure comparison. All the experiments are performed
on an HP machine with Intel Core 2 Duo CPU 3GHz and 6GB RAM.
Our goal is to validate two hypotheses: (1). the optimal results (chromatic number)
of solving DisGC problem using PPTS are close to the results of Tabucol (this indicates
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Fig. 7. Total Number of Conflicts (µ(x)) in each Iteration
that our approach is as accurate as any general meta-heuristic for graph coloring, and
(2). the computation time of PPTS is reasonable. Thus, for the first goal, we compute
the chromatic number of distributed graphs with varying number of vertices #V={100,
200, 300, 500, 1000} and for two different densities ρ=10% and 30% using PPTS and
Tabucol (for each pair of #V and ρ, we generate 10 distributed graphs; 512-bit key is
used). For the second goal, first, we compute the runtime of PPTS with 512-bit key and
with 1024-bit key and compare it with Tabucol for varying #V={100, 200, 300, 500,
1000} and fixed ρ=20% (Fig. 8(b)); second, we perform the comparison between the
execution time of PPTS and Tabucol for varying ρ = {2%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%} and
fixed #V=500 (Fig. 8(c)). Table 1 shows the specified parameters for the experiments.
Table 1. Experimental Parameters
Parameter Selected Values If Fixing
# of vertices 100, 200, 300, 500, 1000 500
Dens. of Edges 2%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 30% 20%
Key Length 512-bit, 1024-bit 512-bit
5.2 Experimental Results
PPTS Solution Quality Fig. 7 depicts the number of total conflicts µ(x) and the num-
ber of iterations required by PPTS and Tabucol for three different graphs (k is set
slightly greater than the optimal chromatic number). While solving DisGC on these
three graphs, the improvements (reduced µ(x)) in each iteration of both approaches are
similar. PPTS generally requires more iterations than Tabucol. This is unavoidable be-
cause due to the privacy concern, the algorithm does not know which external edges
cause conflict, and therefore cannot improve only upon the conflicting edges. Thus, the
search performance is slightly lower, but still acceptable.
Fig. 8(a) shows the chromatic number (min k) for distributed graphs with different
size and density (for each pair of #V and ρ, we randomly generate 10 graphs, solve them
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Fig. 8. Optimal Results and Computational Cost Testing
with two algorithms and different k, and choose the min k). In general, the optimum
performance of the two algorithms is similar.
PPTS Efficiency As the communication cost is small compared to the computation
cost (each single computation consumes significantly more time), we evaluate the effi-
ciency of PPTS with respect to computation time. As shown in Fig. 8(b) and 8(c), the
runtime of PPTS with 512-bit and 1024-bit is not excessive (approximately 30 hours are
required to securely solve a 10-party distributed graph coloring problem with 1000 ver-
tices and density 20%). This can also be improved by using cryptographic accelerators
or parallelizing the computation.
6 Related Work
There is prior work both in distributed optimization as well as in secure optimization.
Silaghi and Rajeshirke [39] show that a secure combinatorial problem solver must nec-
essarily pick the result randomly among optimal solutions to be really secure. Silaghi
and Mitra [38] propose arithmetic circuits for solving constraint optimization problems
that are exponential in the number of variables for any constraint graph. A significantly
more efficient optimization protocol specialized on generalized Vickrey auctions and
based on dynamic programming is proposed by Suzuki and Yokoo [40]. Yokoo et al.
[47] also propose a scheme using public key encryption for secure distributed constraint
satisfaction. Atallah et al.[2] propose protocols for secure supply chain management.
However, none of these can be used to solve the general class of distributed scheduling
problems, which is what we focus on.
Recently, privacy preserving linear programming problem [42, 43, 16, 18, 15, 10,
24] and nonlinear programming problem [19] have been well studied to securely solve
the distributed LP problems amongmultiple parties. However, little work has beenmade
on securing distributed NP-hard problems due to the challenging issue of computational
complexity. Sakuma et al. [37] proposed a genetic algorithm for securely solving two-
party distributed traveling salesman problem (NP-hard). They consider the case that
one party holds the cost vector while the other party holds the tour vector (this is a spe-
cial case of multi-party distributed combinatorial optimization). Following their work,
the distributed TSP problem that is completely partitioned among multiple parties is
securely solved in [22]. Similarly, we securely solve another classic combinatorial opti-
mization model (graph coloring) that is completely partitioned among multiple parties.
Finally, secure computation in real world applications can also be leveraged for
the development of privacy preserving optimization. For instance, in the smart grid
infrastructure [11, 25, 14, 6, 12] and search engine query applications [13, 23, 19, 17],
the secure communication protocols can be proposed based on the extension of privacy
preserving linear or nonlinear programming models (by incorporating more real world
constraints).
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented a privacy preserving algorithm to solve the distributed
graph coloring problem with limited information disclosure. Our solution creates a se-
cure communication protocol based on the existing Tabucol algorithm by making use of
several cryptographic building blocks in novel ways. It also provides a roadmap for gen-
eralizing the solution to other distributed combinatorial optimization problems. Given
the iterative nature of the solution, we also identify the possible inference attacks on the
output in each iteration, and propose a synchronous move mechanism to resolve such
problems. In the meanwhile, theoretical study is also given to show the guaranteed pro-
tocol security and mitigated inference risks in the proposed approach. We analyze the
computation and communication complexity of our modified tabu search, and experi-
mentally show that the PPTS protocol provides nearly identical optimum performance
as Tabucol without sacrificing efficiency for privacy.
There are several interesting future directions.While we examine a specific data par-
titioning for the DisGC problem, other data partitions are also possible. For example,
perhaps a party may hold the information about graph edges rather than graph vertices
(this could happen, for example in scheduling). We plan to explore this problem and
develop solutions for it. Secondly, while graph coloring has many applications, there
are several other combinatorial optimization problems, such as mixed integer program-
ming [44], scheduling [28, 26], knapsack and vehicle routing [36] and even some data
mining problems [30, 32, 29, 20, 31] which can be naturally distributed. We plan to ex-
plore how our privacy preserving tabu search can be applied in these domains. Finally,
while tabu-search is generally quite useful, it does not work well for all applications.
There are several other algorithms such as simulated annealing, or genetic algorithms
that also enjoy wide usage. We will look at how such algorithms could be made privacy
preserving in the future.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Assuming that vi is an endpoint of n external edges eij , j ∈ [1, n], we represent
that the colors of eij ’s endpoints in x (and x
′) are conflicted or not as µij(x) = 0 or 1
(and µij(x
′) = 0 or 1).
If µ(x) and µ(x′) are revealed in each iteration, while Pa changes the color of vi
(from xi to x
′
i),
∑
∀j∈[1,n][µij(x
′)−µij(x)] (denoted as δ) is known to Pa. Specifically,
δ ∈ [−n, n] has following cases:
– Case 1: if δ = n, Pa learns: no edge from ∀j ∈ [1, n], eij has a conflict in x , but
all the n edges have conflicts in x′ (thus, the colors of all n border vertices from
other parties are identical to x′i);
– Case 2: if δ = −n, Pa learns: all the edges have conflicts in x but all the conflicts
are eliminated in x′ (thus, the colors of all n border vertices from other parties are
identical to xi);
– Case 3: more generally, if −n < δ < n, every edge has a probability to have
conflict. We denote the probability that a specific edge eij has no conflict in x but
has conflict in x′ (and has conflict in x but has no conflict in x′) as Prob[µij(x →
x′) : 0 → 1] (and Prob[µij(x→ x
′) : 1 → 0]) where δ ∈ (−n, n) (since inferring
that eij has conflict in either x or x
′ should result in learning vj’s color by Pa).
⋄.We first consider that δ ≥ 0 (if δ < 0, we can obtain a similar result). We denote
the number of edges (out of n) where µij(x) → µij(x
′) : 0 → 1 as δ1; denote the
number of edges (out of n) where µij(x) → µij(x
′) : 1 → 0 as δ0; denote the number
of edges (out of n) where µij(x) → µij(x
′) : 0 → 0 as δc (1 → 1 is impossible since xi
is changed). Thus, we have δ1+ δ0+ δc = n. Since δ1− δ0 = δ (overall difference), we
have δ1 ≤ ⌊
n+δ
2 ⌋ and δ0 ≤ ⌊
n−δ
2 ⌋ (if n− δ is an odd number, due to δc ≥ 0, we have
δ1 <
n+δ
2 ). Furthermore, it is clear that δ1 ≥ δ. We now discuss all possible values of
(δ1, δ0).
Specifically, given δ and n, (δ1, δ0) has following possible pairs of values: (δ, 0),
(δ + 1, 1), . . . , (⌊n+δ2 ⌋, ⌊
n−δ
2 ⌋) (equally possible for all pairs). Hence, the probability
of valuing each pair is 1
⌊n−δ
2
⌋+1
. As a consequence, for a given edge, Prob[µij(x →
x′) : 0 → 1] = 1
⌊n−δ
2
⌋+1
× [ δ
n
+ δ+1
n
+ · · ·+
⌊n+δ
2
⌋
n
]=
δ+⌊n+δ
2
⌋
2n and Prob[µij(x→ x
′) :
1 → 0] = 1
⌊n−δ
2
⌋+1
× [ 0
n
+ 1
n
+ · · ·+
⌊n−δ
2
⌋
n
]=
⌊n−δ
2
⌋
2n . We thus have:
1. since the probability Prob[µij(x → x
′) : 0 → 1] = Prob[xj = x
′
i] with a known
fixed δ, partyPa can guess that xj = x
′
i and the endpoint colors of eij are conflicted
in solution x′ with a probability of
δ+⌊n+δ
2
⌋
2n .
2. since the probability Prob[µij(x → x
′) : 1 → 0] = Prob[xj = xi] with a known
fixed δ, partyPa can guess that xj = xi and the endpoint colors of eij are conflicted
in solution x with a probability of
⌊n−δ
2
⌋
2n .
⋄. Similarly, if δ < 0, we can deduce that Prob[xj = xi] = Prob[µij(x → x
′) :
1 → 0] =
−δ+⌊n−δ
2
⌋
2n and Prob[xj = x
′
i] = Prob[µij(x→ x
′) : 0→ 1] =
⌊n+δ
2
⌋
2n .
Finally, we verify Case 1 and 2 in the general probability computation: if δ = n, we
have Prob[µij(x → x
′) : 0 → 1] = 1 and Prob[µij(x → x
′) : 1 → 0] = 0, hence the
color of vj is determined as x
′
i; if δ = −n, we have Prob[µij(x → x
′) : 0 → 1] = 0
and Prob[µij(x→ x
′) : 1→ 0] = 1, hence the color of vj is determined as xi.
B Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We let µa(x) and µa(x
′) be the number of Pa’s conflicted internal edges in
x and x′ respectively, and denote δa as µa(x
′) − µa(x). If only µ(x
′) < µ(x′) or
µ(x′) ≥ µ(x) are revealed in each iteration, while Pa changes the color of vi (from xi
to x′i), Pa knows only δ + δa < 0 or δ + δa ≥ 0 (δ =
∑
∀j∈[1,n](µij(x
′) − µij(x))).
We now try to compute the probability Prob[xj = x
′] and Prob[xj = x]. Essentially,
if δ is known and fixed, Prob[xj = x
′] and Prob[xj = x] can be computed in terms
of Lemma 1. Hence, we discuss the possible privacy breaches for all cases. Since Pa
knows δa and the relationship between δ + δa and 0, we look at two cases:
– Case 1: if δ + δa < 0, we have δ < −δa. Since δa is known to Pa and it can be
any integer, we discuss all possible δa as following.
1. if δa ≥ n, it is impossible to obtain δ + δa < 0 because δ ∈ [−n, n];
2. if δa < −n, δ can be any integer in [−n, n] to generate output µ(x
′) < µ(x),
hence, probabilities Prob[xj = x
′
i] and Prob[xj = xi] is minimized (no addi-
tional information is revealed);
3. if −n ≤ δa ≤ n− 1, Pa can learn that−n ≤ δ < −δa (regularly,−n ≤ δ ≤ n
is known to Pa). With the greater −δa, Pa learns less additional information.
The worst privacy breach case should be δa = n − 1 such that δ = −n is
inferred. At this time, Pa can infer xj with probability Prob[xj = xi] = 1.
– Case 2: if δ + δa ≥ 0, we have δ ≥ −δa. Similarly, we discuss following cases:
1. if δa < −n, it is impossible to obtain δ + δa ≥ 0 because δ ∈ [−n, n];
2. if δa ≥ n, δ can be any integer in [−n, n] to generate output µ(x
′) ≥ µ(x),
hence, probabilities Prob[xj = x
′
i] and Prob[xj = xi] is minimized (no addi-
tional information is revealed);
3. if −n ≤ δa < n, Pa can learn that −δa ≤ δ ≤ n (regularly, −n ≤ δ ≤ n
is known to Pa). With the smaller −δa, Pa learns less additional information.
The worst privacy breach case should be δa = −n such that δ = n is inferred.
At this time, Pa can infer xj with probability Prob[xj = x
′
i] = 1.
In sum, with greater −δa in Case 1 and smaller −δa in Case 2, it should be more
difficult to guess δ and infer xj = xi or xj = x
′
i in most cases, compared with known
δ (to Pa). Hence, the risk of inference attack has been reduced in general. However, we
have two worst cases that still breaches privacy: 1. As δa = n−1 and µ(x
′) < µ(x) are
the output to Pa in an iteration, thus Pa learns ∀j ∈ [1, n], xj = xi; 2. As δa = −n and
µ(x′) ≥ µ(x) are the output to Pa in an iteration, thus Pa learns ∀j ∈ [1, n], xj = x
′
i.
C Proof of Lemma 3
Table 2. Notations in Synchronous Move
vi and vj Pa and Pb’s vertex for move
µa(x) and µa(x
′) Pa’s number of conflicted internal edges in x and x
′ respectively
µb(x) and µb(x
′) Pb’s number of conflicted internal edges in x and x
′ respectively
δa and δb δa = µa(x
′)− µa(x), δb = µb(x
′)− µb(x)
∀s, eis; ∀t, ejt n external edges with endpoint vi; n
′ external edges with endpoint vj
∀s, µis(x) and µis(x
′) eis is conflicted or not in x and x
′
∀t, µjt(x) and µjt(x
′) ejt is conflicted or not in x and x
′
δ δ =
∑
∀s
[µis(x
′)− µis(x)]
δ′ δ′ =
∑
∀t
[µjt(x
′)− µjt(x)]
Proof. We first present some notations in synchronous move in Table 2. With a syn-
chronous move, µ(x′) < µ(x) or µ(x′) ≥ µ(x) is revealed. δa and δb are known to
Pi and Pj respectively. We now discuss the potential inferences on the above revealed
information.
First, if µ(x′) < µ(x), we thus have δa + δ + δb + δ
′ < 0. Pa knows δa and
δ ∈ [−n, n]. Since δb and δ
′ can be any integer, no additional information other than
δ < −δa − δb − δ
′ can be inferred (as soon as δa is very large, δ can still be any
integer in [−n, n] because δb + δ
′ may be negative and sufficiently small to anonymize
δ). Similarly, if vj is a border vertex of Pb, Pb cannot learn any additional information
other than δa + δ + δb + δ
′ < 0 and µ(x′) < µ(x).
Second, if µ(x′) ≥ µ(x), we thus have δa + δ + δb + δ
′ ≥ 0. For the same reason,
δ is an unknown integer between [−n, n] to Pi, and δ
′ is an unknown integer between
[−n′, n′] to Pj . No additional information can be inferred.
In a special case, Pa’s vi is adjacent to a vertex of Pb (this is unknown to Pb). Pb
knows that Pa is moving a border vertex and the result of securely comparing µ(x) and
µ(x′). However, Pb cannot infer that Pa is moving a border vertex that is adjacent to Pb
without colluding with other parties (since Pa may have many border vertices, adjacent
to many parties). Hence, synchronous move guarantees security for this special case.
Thus, the inference attacks stated in Lemma 1 and 2 can be eliminated.
